Capital market dysfunctionality conference: living online library

Presentation

The Crash of the Financial Sector: Bad Luck or Bad Structure

(Paul Wooley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality, UTS, Sydney)

Nobody thought this might happen. Things can go wrong. But the number of things that have gone wrong, and the ferocity with which they have gone wrong, I think was beyond the imagination of almost everyone.

Alan Blinder, Princeton University, and former Deputy Chair US Federal Reserve.

The global financial crisis was thrust dramatically before public attention when the US housing bubble burst in 2007. But trouble had been building up in several quarters over years. After all, over inflated house prices do not explain what drove financial powerhouses to bankruptcy, froze capital markets, set equity markets dropping like so many stones, and forced governments across the globe to rescue financial systems and prop up economies. There is no simple answer as to why the global financial system was so vulnerable and ill prepared. But a number of issues repeatedly emerge in the discussion as policy makers, academics and industry practitioners seek to understand what happened: economic theory, the widespread use – or misuse – of financial engineering, the massive leverage that had been allowed to build in the system, contributing fiscal policies, as well as business and financial cultures that nurtured contributing behaviours. The debate is ongoing.

Click the categories at the left to explore articles.

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis, there was much talk of change: international agreements, stringent corporate governance, industry self-regulation and a re-evaluation of the assumptions that underpinned financial activities. Governments seemed determined to rein in industry behaviour, in return for the billions spent preventing total financial collapse. The G20 rather than the G7 has become the focus of global economic discussions, broadening the debate to include increasingly powerful emerging economies. A Financial Stability Board has been established to develop global regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability. The debate on the dysfunctionality of markets has been given new vigour. And governments are negotiating their own balance between industry regulation, including salary and bonus capping, and self-regulation which, in the words of Berkeley Economist Barry Eichengreen ‘is the economic equivalent of letting children decide their own diets’.

Click the categories at the left to explore articles.

Above is an interactive feature containing overviews of the speakers and subjects covered at the Capital Market Dysfunctionality Conference at UTS, in October 2009. Please use its inner navigation to interact with its content. The feature is also a living library containing the papers delivered at the conference, and we ask attendees and others to add reference resources – to enable it to grow during the conference and beyond, as a research and teaching aid.

The Global Financial Crisis began with a series of financial and economic imbalances which had developed at an increasingly frenetic pace over recent years. The first bubble to burst was in the US housing market and the consequences spread across asset classes and geographies like a series of tumbling dominos, each one taking down others as it fell, the momentum gathering and the impact of each collapse magnifying.

The widespread use of financial engineering to distribute risk, combined with the massive leverage that had been allowed to build in the system, fiscal policies, national economies and financial institutions were exposed as relying excessively on best case scenarios and inadequately prepared to cope with the crisis.

We had borrowed too much, against assets that were priced too high. When the good times were over, prices fell, and debts were called in. The global economy was caught short – from suburban mortgage borrowers, to international financial powerhouses, we didn’t have the cash to get out of debt and we couldn’t sell what we owned at a high enough price to cover what we owed.

How academics, policy makers and financial practitioners come to understand how a collapse on such a scale was possible, will largely determine what the response – if any – is appropriate.

The following conversation is the first of our Cafe21C interview series. B21C editor Mike Hanley talks to Dr Paul Woolley, founder of the Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality at the London School of Economics, the University of Toulouse, and UTS; Ron Bird, Professor of Finance and Economics at UTS: Business, and Jack Gray, Adjunct Professor of Economics at UTS: Business. The video topics ranged across the gamut of economics, from the inadequacy of the efficient markets hypothesis, through the impact of agents on the size of the financial markets and their efficiency, through to policy prescriptions to avoid another crisis.

http://www.vimeo.com/7304620

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  1. [...] click here for the full Cafe21C conversation and more on how academics, policy makers and financial practitioners have…. [...]

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Business21C Magazine Autumn 2010

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