In communications, speed and cost are synonymous. Want more bandwidth? It’s going to cost you. It’s the same in computing. Want to see less of the hour-glass? Get a faster processor. So when we consider what the Australian Content Filter is going to cost we can quantify it in speed and dollars. Internet entrepreneur Martin Rushe reports
Australian users pay in speed, potentially getting a slower Internet service. But who pays the dollars to install and operate the filtering system? The Australian Government are going to fund administrative aspects. Where will it get the money? Clearly from Australian users. The rest, the Government hopes, will be foisted onto the ISPs. Where will they get the money? Again: Australian users. Can you see a theme developing?
Last year, in an effort to quantify the speed cost, the Government tasked Enex Testlabs, a private company, to test a range of content filtering technologies. The results, championed by the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), provided, at least to the Department’s mind, conclusive proof that the content filter would have little or no impact on speed for Australian end users.
And you have to admit, the results look pretty compelling: -
• Speed degradation of < 3%
• 100 per cent blocking accuracy
• 0% incidence of blocking sites incorrectly
But dig deeper and it appears the Department may have done a little content filtering of its own. The appendices to the report, provided separately, shows that tests were run at a maximum speed of 8Mbps. The National Broadband Network, Senator Conroy’s other pet project, is going to run at 100Mbps, namely twelves times faster. Some might argue this is like testing your drains with a pipette.
Some of the speed tests were conducted using two ISPs. One has since leaked that fifteen people used the filter concurrently. If we imagine the other ISP funnelled fifteen people into it too, does that mean the filter was put through its paces by as many as thirty people at the same time?
Admittedly, this was a first pass at bottoming out the speed costs of the filter. One imagines more comprehensive tests are to follow. But it’s premature for the DBCDE to be pointing to these results as the basis for an argument.
Another flaw clearly acknowledged by Enex in its report is the ease of circumventing the filter. One possible method is to use a ‘proxy’. Proxies allow you to appear as someone, and more specifically somewhere, else. When you specify a proxy server your internet session appears to originate from the proxy and not from you. Pick a proxy outside Australia and the filter will ignore you.
If you would like to see how easy it is, whatever you do, don’t try this at home:-
Step 1: Type “open proxy” into Google.
Step 2 : Copy any of the open proxy addresses into the proxy settings of your browser.
Step 3: Adopt your smuggest tone and call Senator Conroy’s office to tell him you have just beaten his content filtering system.
To be fair, when you call Mr Conroy you won’t be telling him anything he doesn’t already know. His department acknowledges that a ‘technically competent user’ can circumvent filtering. But the instructions above do lower the bar somewhat on technical competency.
Another thing to avoid when you’re not following these instructions, is picking a proxy in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China or any of those other countries with which we have a converging Internet filtering policy. Their filtering systems may be even more severe than ours.
Finally, when we talk about ‘beating the filter’ we must consider who is beating it and for what purpose. Consumers of content may wish to beat the filter to access restricted material and conversely providers of restricted material will be seeking to make their content available. You will recall these content providers are defined via the so-called blacklist, the list of restricted web addresses used by the filter.
If the blacklist is to be implemented at the ISP level, clearly the ISPs must have access to it. The FAQs associated with the Enex report state the Government’s intention to solve this potentially hazardous exchange by passing the blacklist between stakeholders as a secret and encrypted file.
Which is where Barbara Streisand enters the equation.
The Streisand Effect is a law of the Internet which states, and I paraphrase because it is highly technical, that if you wish to publicise something to the absolute maximum and involve the whole Internet community who otherwise would have shown indifference – make it a secret.
Barbara coined the phrase when she filed a lawsuit against some fellow who audaciously photographed one of her homes (in his defence, he was passing overhead on a plane). News of the lawsuit was met with general indifference. Until Barbara tried to hush it up and then, Yentl! It became the biggest story on the net.
So I hope that encryption is good, because when the blacklist comes out the world’s hackers will be putting on extra coffee.

