Posts Tagged ‘Finance’

The four flows of globalising

Tuesday, September 14th, 2010

Globalisation is so last century, argues Professor Stewart Clegg. If we want to understand what’s going on in the world today, we should analyse the flows that encourage the process of globalising.

American sociologist George Ritzer defines globalisation as a transplanetary set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the growing multidimensional flows of people, objects, places, and information as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows.

Globalisation intensifies social relations over ever-greater distances, linking different and previously separated peoples, transforming the spatial and temporal organisation of social relations and transactions. It is premised on global flows of power, people, ideas and things.

The result is that the world is compressed while, simultaneously, experience of (and in) it is intensified.

As globalisation is a relational process, it is better to think of it as a verb – ‘globalising’ – than as a noun. Globalising processes have been underway since humans first moved out of Africa. Qualitatively different phenomena have been progressively globalising through the translation of innovations from one place to another, whether carried by genes, viruses, militarisation, agriculture, navigation, terrorism, crime or finance. In contemporary times, globalising increasingly flows through immaterial forms such as financial innovation – immaterial forms that have substantial material consequences.

Globalisation in the contemporary world is a process organised through four major flows: people, procurement, communication and finance. These flows are affected by ‘islands’ around which they must navigate: the organisational responses of states. The paradoxical result of the extreme financialisation of financial flows has been to weaken both markets and states in the neoliberal arenas of globalisation.

Over the millennia, there have been distinct waves of globalisation and, as any surfer will tell you, waves often carry diverse flows – rips, gutters, breaks and dumps – to catch the unwary. Indeed, flows can be more important than waves.

Liquid globalising and the circuits of power

In globalising, shapes and forms shift rapidly, flows change abruptly and liquid phenomena fix neither time nor space. Continuous flux is the norm, and though time is relative and plural, not absolute, flows of time associated with digital immediacy become dominant globally. Presence and immediacy hasten the adoption of dominant discourses, as they can flow anywhere and everywhere simultaneously.

Globalisation has involved not merely economic forms but whole forms of life. Contemporary globalising and organising occurs at its core through four major systems of tightly coupled flows: procurement, people, communication and finance.

People flows

The four flows of globalisation

1. People flows

When the 2009 GFC hit China, there were reports of millions of employees returning to the interior of China from the trading zones of coastal cities. These workers had come in their millions to be transformed from peasants to proletarians in one generation, one of the most significant internal migrations in history.

Elsewhere, cities such as Mexico City, Sao Paulo and Mumbai act as magnets, attracting global and national investment capital and previously peasant labour to take up employment opportunities created by that capital.

Globalising neoliberalism places barriers around marginal forms of materiality, creating in much of the developing world tightly regulated special trading and export zones in which capital, not citizens or the state, shapes the rules. The firms are highly competitive on price but, typically, don’t give a damn about criteria such as sustainability, human development, liberty, equality or fraternity.

We can distinguish between different types of global flows of people: tourists, corporate elites, entrepreneurs of the criminal narco-economy, and the celebrity elites of football, popular music and cinema.

Procurement flows

The four flows of globalisation

2. Procurement flows

The diagram opposite shows the basic model of procurement flows. Wherever matter can be moved easily around the world, outsourcing of labour can cheapen production. Activities that can be performed anywhere, such as call-centre work, processing of accounting data, interpretation of radiological data or preparing manuscripts for publication, can be digitised, then located in cheaper labour markets, organised globally so the flow continues 24 hours a day.

Outsourcing also occurs when organisations seek to lower costs of activities by arranging for some elements to be done more cheaply by specialists. Sometimes outsourcing overlaps with tourism, like medical tourism, where people undergo surgical procedures in countries where health-care costs are lower, or the military, which has outsourced much work supporting the war in Iraq to companies like Halliburton. While outsourcing may increase corporate profit, it can lessen corporate control, a spectacular example being the recent recall of more than eight million Toyota vehicles worldwide.

Communication flows

The four flows of globalisation

3. Communication flows

Ever since Marx and Engels wrote The German Ideology in 1848, there has been a conviction that the most fundamental form of power lies in the ability to shape the human mind. Communication and its control is at the heart of this modality. Power is never-ending in its struggles, operates at every level and in all types of social practice, and includes relational, asymmetric, resistance-inducing power to as well as power over; hence, there is always power and resistance.

The rise of mass self-communication makes the privatisation of the digital commons profitable for those commanding networked and network-making power. However, the space constituted through its messages is anarchic, a space in which new pluralities of ideas can and do circulate, with subversive, resistant effects. Think of the role of social media in building internal political opposition to the Iranian regime and its clerical supporters. Mass self-communication through new social technologies is undoubtedly of great sociological and organisational significance.

Financial flows

The four flows of globalisation

4. Financial flows

The fusion of neoclassical economics and political liberalism, with their joint adherence to privileging individual subjects and their liberties, became a central node of political flows in the 1980s. The liberalisation of the financial system, along with the digital revolution, led to widespread use of new financial instruments. These became de rigeur as finance capital took on a hyper-real quality.

The flip side of the neoliberal coin was an anti-regulation and anti-state pose, with programs that practised deregulation, privatisation and the externalisation of unavoidable costs (ecological despoliation, pollution) to the developing world. Domestically, taxation reform favoured the elites, while elsewhere, its remedies for capitalism’s ills imposing harsh welfare-to-work transition regimes on the poor. Naomi Klein refers to it as a shock therapy that creates little but destroys much.

Globalising neoliberalism furthered the integration of financial markets, collapsing the importance of local time and creating instantaneous financial transactions in an economy increasingly premised on financial significations. Globally integrated financial markets increased the speed of information flows and directness of transactions. Instantaneous financial trading means shocks felt in one market are communicated immediately around the world, as was the case with US subprime loans. The tight coupling of the world’s financial system, and its subsequent chaos, limited nation-states’ ability to control capital flows and, hence, fiscal and monetary policy.

Modern processes of globalising contain paradoxes. It is a world of power circuits, comprising flows of people, procurement, communication and finance meeting the solidity of states as islands in the flow. The networks of power in and around states constitute default networks for global liquidity, as witnessed in the GFC. The continuing importance of the state as an organisational form and object of analysis has not been well served by the relative isolation of organisation from state theory. It has been detrimental to the development of both.

This article is an edited version of a paper delivered as the keynote address to the 26th European Group for Organisation Studies (EGOS) Colloquium in Lisbon in July, 2010.

Ph3: Three minute thesis at UTS Business

Friday, August 27th, 2010

Ph3 prize winners, from right, Richard Norman (winner), Chelsea Wise (winner, people's choice), Professor Tracy Taylor, Nicole Sutton (runner-up), Professor Stephen Taylor

Picture the scene: you’re at a party, you get chatting, things are warming up and you’re keen to impress. Then it happens. Talk turns to work. And for you work is academia. Not just any academia but you’re two years through research into a field so specialist and so obscure, that even your supervisor’s eyes glaze over when you mention it.

Yes, you may have a passion for, say, ‘the-limitation-and-distortions-of-corporate-governance-issues-in-culturally-biased-wholly-owned-subsidiaries-of-community-sport-organisations-on-societal-systems and stakeholders’, and indeed what you discover may one day change the world. But the subtle intricacies of what you love don’t always communicate over a luke-warm chardonnay at a noisy party. Let’s face it, it hasn’t been your most successful pick up line to date, has it?

To the rescue of Phd and and MPhil students around Australia comes the inaugural Three Minute Thesis competition, or Ph3 as it has been dubbed at UTS Business School, where the first-round heats were held on August the 19th.

Nine post graduate students at various stages of their research studies, representing five management, disciplines took the challenge to present a compelling and coherent summary of their theses in under three minutes. They also took on the bigger challenge of doing it with only one Powerpoint slide, and no fancy animations.

Humour aside, the event is part of an important national initiative with competitors from 32 of Australia’s universities competing for a prize of $5000 at the national final in September, at the University of Queensland. The goal of the competition is to assist research students to develop academic research and communications skills. The finals will be judged by ABC Science Broadcaster, Bernie Hobbs.

But, as the event on the 19 August demonstrated, the benefits are broad. The opportunity to listen to concisely explained summaries of some of the work that is going on around UTS Business, alone, gave participants and members of the audience a unique insight into the research depth that UTS offers.

The strength in presentation skills were as rewarding as the range of topics was varied. We heard how Bruce Wayne of Batman is the archetypal non-profit organisation, wishing to save the world, but needing a range of tools (Bat-toys), consultancy (family retainer in Bat cave) and funding (dead millionaire parents) to smooth his journey. We learned about the impact of Muslim women surf life savers on community sport and cultural exchanged, and gained an insight into how wholly owned foreign subsidiary companies structure their management control tools. And that was just for starters.

Richard Norman, a researcher from the Centre for Health Care Economics was presented with a cheque for $500 as the winner of this first-round heat. Richard’s thesis is ‘Limitations and distortions in outcome measurement in economic evaluation of healthcare’. Richard will now compete with other Phd students from around the UTS campus for the chance to represent the University at the National finals next month.

Nicole Sutton from the School of Accounting, was awarded runner up, with her thesis on ‘Management Control of research activities in Universities’. Nicole was presented with a cheque for $250. Chelsea Wise from the School of Marketing won the People’s Choice Award of $250 for her entertaining and enlightening discussion, ‘Novel specification: How do consumers cope?’

The final of the UTS leg of the competition is being held on Tuesday 31st August, at the Great Hall Level 5, UTS Tower. 5.30 for a 6 pm start.

The winner will go on to compete in the National finals the University of Queensland on 21st September, where prizes of $5000, $2000 and $1000 are up for grabs.

Participants in UTS Business Ph3 heat, on 19 August, 2010

UTS Business' Ph3 participants with Professor Stephen Taylor

Tirukumar Thiagarajah, Accounting, Exploring management control systems in the third sector

Hazel Maxwell, Leisure, Sport & Tourism, An exploration of the role of sports organisations in community development: The case of Australian Muslim women

James Wakefield, Accounting, Control and performance of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries

Richard Norman, Centre for Healthcare Economics, Limitations and distortions in outcome measurement in economic evaluation of healthcare

Chelsea Wise, Marketing, Novel specification: How do consumers cope?

Nicole Sutton, Accounting, Management control of research in universities

Christoph Hechelmann, Leisure, Sport & Tourism, Effects of social media engagement on the emotional attachment to sport sponsoring brands

Peter Sinclair, Marketing, The comparative effects of societal syndromes on knowledge discovery in new product development

Alastair Rylatt, Management, Stakeholder commitment over time

The US Recovery Act: Billions wasted or money well spent?

Friday, February 19th, 2010

President Barack Obama has been heavily criticised for his handling of the Financial Crisis and the stimulus package. But economic modelling from Monash University’s Centre of Policy Studies shows that things could have been far worse. Professor Peter B Dixon explains.

On the anniversary of the US government’s Recovery Act, analysts and pundits have been debating the success or failure of the Obama program. A group of Australian researchers believe they have the answer.

Peter Dixon and his colleagues at Monash University’s Centre of Policy Studies have built a detailed model of the US economy. The model is used by several government agencies in Washington including the US International Trade Commission and the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Homeland Security.

In this video, Peter talks about recent modelling of the US recession. He explains that without a stimulus package, the recession would be worse than any economic downturn since the 1930s. Over the period 2009 to 2015 it would have cost the US about $8 trillion or approximately 60 per cent of a year’s GDP. This is the value of lost output associated with lost jobs.

Even with the Obama stimulus package the recession remains very serious, but the cost is cut back to about $4.5 trillion or about 35 per cent of a year’s GDP. Speaking on 17 February 2010, Obama said ‘One year later, it is largely thanks to the Recovery Act that a second Depression is no longer a possibility’.

Can economists learn from how physicists apply universal laws?

Friday, January 29th, 2010

Dr Austin Gerig believes that by following the approach physicists use to describe the workings of the universe, economists may be able to uncover universal principles that explain economic phenomena, and even predict extreme economic events. Perhaps we’ll see the next GFC coming.

‘The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction.’
Albert Einstein, 1918.

When researching the natural world, physicists often search for universal laws to explain the systematic working of things. It is an approach that has served them well, but is it one that can transfer to other disciplines? Are there universal laws, for example, that underlie economic systems, and should economists search for such laws?

I believe the answer is yes. I believe there are regularities in social and economic systems that result from universal underlying principles (if not universal laws) and that one task of the economist – perhaps the most important one – is to find these regularities and understand the principles behind them.

As an example, consider the way that prices move in financial markets.

Over a century ago, French mathematician Louis Bachelier proposed that stock prices move up or down in random increments and that price changes are unpredictable. This is called the random walk model for stock prices.

When tested with economic data – real stock prices over time – the random walk model is surprisingly accurate. It holds not only for stock prices, but also for the prices of many other items: stock indices, derivative instruments, commodities and other economic goods, and even for the prices of contracts traded on prediction markets.

The regularity of this behavior across different items suggests some universal principle is behind it. In fact, many economists believe this is true, and they attribute the randomness of prices to the profit maximization (or loss aversion) of investors.

The theory says that if stock prices weren’t random, but were in some way predictable, this predictability would be quickly removed. After all, who would be willing to sell a stock for $90 if everyone knew the price was going to move up to $100? Wouldn’t sellers try to get something closer to $100 right now, and wouldn’t buyers be willing to pay something closer to $100? When these individuals push the price to $100, the predictability in the price movement is removed. If predictable price movements disappear, then the only way for prices to move is with random increments.

A second interesting regularity found in economic prices is that very large price movements, such as stock market crashes, occur frequently. Again, this is true for many different economic items.

To understand just how large these price movements are, consider what it would mean if human heights behaved in a similar way. Assume for a moment that adult human heights were not as they actually are, but instead varied between individuals in the same way that price movements vary. In your city, someone would probably be over 30 feet tall. In your country, the tallest person would likely reach 150 feet, and the tallest person in the world would stand over 1000 feet.

The distinction between human heights and price movements is important because most financial models assume that the distribution of stock returns is the same as the distribution pattern for human heights – the ubiquitous bell-shaped curve known as the normal (or Gaussian) distribution. If this were the case, very large returns (analogous to a 150 foot person) should never occur. But this is wrong. For reasons we do not fully understand, stock returns are not distributed according to a normal distribution. Instead, they have a much larger peak and the ‘tails’ or extremes of the distribution are thicker. This means that large price movements occur more often than predicted.

20100129-Gerig-Fig1

Figure 1 shows the distribution for the daily returns of the S&P 500 stock index from January 3, 1950 to November 25, 2009. (This plot uses publicly available data and can be replicated by downloading data here
). The horizontal axis measures the different sizes of returns (0.02 is a 2% return, 0.04 is a 4% return, etc.). The vertical axis shows the relative likelihood of these price changes – the higher the red bar, the more likely that event is observed. Small returns, close to zero, are the most likely occurrence. A normal distribution is also shown in the figure – it is the blue line.

The inset plot shows the probability that a daily return is above a certain threshold value. It enlarges the tail of the distribution – the area where large price returns are recorded. You can see that the probability of large returns is much higher than what normal distribution predicts, i.e., the red curve is above the blue curve for large values of x. The five highest returns, their values, and the dates they were observed are highlighted. Not surprisingly, the largest return occurred on Black Monday, October 19, 1987, when stock markets crashed around the world.

If you look at the y-axis in the inset plot, the probability for a daily return to exceed 10% is around 10-4. This means it has happened approximately once every 40 years. For comparison, the blue curve – a normal distribution – predicts this to happen once every 7×1018 years, which for all practical purposes means never.

One way to explain the discrepancy between observed stock returns and financial models is to consider large price movements as outliers – surprising events outside of the normal model. There are several reasons to do this. First, there are good underlying reasons to assume a normal distribution for returns as a first guess, and no one has yet developed a theory for why it should be otherwise. Second, we usually explain large price movements in this way – stock markets crashed because computer trading malfunctioned or the global financial crises occurred because banks made large mistakes. With these explanations, we implicitly suggest that they are one-time events – outliers – that can be accounted for and controlled in the future. The problem is, despite our efforts, they keep happening.

An alternative explanation is that something more fundamental is causing these events – perhaps an elementary principle underlies the existence of extreme price movements. There are several reasons to believe this is true. First, these events occur universally across traded items. I’m unaware of any economic price series that does not exhibit this property. Second, the empirical evidence does not show these events as statistical outliers. You can see this for the S&P 500 index in the inset plot where the red curve extends continuously in a uniform way down to the points where extreme price movements are recorded. These points do not exist by themselves but fit nicely where you’d expect them when extrapolating the red curve from smaller price movements. Finally, there is evidence that price returns for different stocks all deviate from the normal distribution in the exact same way.

20100129-Gerig-Fig2

Figure 2 shows this result for six stocks that are traded on the New York, London, and Madrid stock exchanges. This data is not all from the same time period. By appropriately rescaling the axes for each stock, the distributions collapse on the same non-normal curve. Why would these unrelated price series all behave in the exact same way unless something fundamental was the cause?

As I mentioned, I believe there are regularities in social and economic systems that can be explained by universal principles. The regularity of economic price movements is one example. The reason why prices are random is understood – it occurs because individuals are profit maximizing. The reason prices deviate from a normal distribution is not understood and is currently a matter of much debate. I believe the evidence suggests that some universal mechanism underlies these deviations, and that large price movements are not outliers to an otherwise correct (normal) model. If this is true, the methodologies used in physics can help economists understand what is driving the result. If it is due to something such as human behavior or the way in which markets are structured, then there might be ways to curtail behavior or structure markets differently such that these extreme events do not occur. If it is due to some economic principle, then perhaps it is something we can only understand and better prepare for.

Are smart markets better markets?

Friday, January 29th, 2010

Smart people have come into finance. But contrary to what economic theory suggests, the increased IQ hasn’t stabilised markets. In fact, argues Professor Harrison Hong, it seems they have returned to the kind of instability associated with stock markets around 100 years ago.

If you really want to know why the financial system nearly collapsed in the fall of 2008, I can tell you in one sentence… because smart guys had started working on Wall Street.’
Calvin Trillin, ‘Wall Street Smarts’ New York Times, October 13, 2009

In the past 30 years, the people working in finance have become smarter and smarter. Like moths to a light bulb, the world’s best and brightest have been drawn to Wall Street by astronomical rewards. Three Nobel Prizes in less than 20 years awarded for advances in financial engineering for the capital markets; skyrocketing numbers of PhDs and Masters in finance globally; and technological advances in capital markets, which have greatly outstripped those in other industries, attest to the brain power that has made its way into this industry over others.

But contrary to what traditional economics – in the form of the efficient markets hypothesis – would suggest, smart thinking and smart practice have not brought market stability. In fact, the bubbles and troughs that we see today are as frequent and as destabilising as those that characterised the less mature and more fragmented markets at the beginning of the evolution of capital markets a century ago.

What gives?

It turns out that the very cleverness that makes markets much more efficient than they used to be also affects their stability and robustness. Because market participants are smarter, they switch on to trends much faster – they pile in on the way up and bail out on the way down much faster than they used to. This affects volatility and makes markets much more prone to bubbles and busts.

The smartest guys in the room

Evidence that clever people have been attracted to the finance sector is clear.

For instance, in 1972 only five percent of Harvard undergraduates went into finance. By 1992, that had risen to 15 percent and approached nearly 20 percent in 2007. More broadly, the number of PhDs and Masters in finance awarded internationally has also grown.

It’s no mystery why. Financial incentives are significant. Prior to the 2008 crash, wages in finance were on average 40 percent higher than wages in other industries. But averages are one thing and they don’t emphasise enough the impact of the massive packages received by those at the top.

At the same time, there has been an increasing trend in the professionalisation of asset managers, with more people managing investments on behalf of others (individuals or organisations) with direct ownership of shares in the US equity market dropping from 47.9 percent in 1981 to 21.5 percent in 2007.

All this financial innovation has been complemented and accelerated by innovations in information technology. Asset prices respond to news faster than ever and markets are deeper, more integrated and increasingly globalised.

The cost of trading has dropped to a fraction of its previous cost and there has been an explosion in turnover, peaking at 215 percent (in the US) in 2007.

According to the efficient markets hypothesis, markets are informationally efficient – meaning that the price of a financial asset reflects all the information known about it. The asset price will change rapidly whenever new information becomes available. The smarter people are, the quicker they can unearth, interpret and make information available. Combine this with the 30-year revolution in communications technology that enables rapid – almost instant – dissemination of information, and you’d expect the smarter the markets become, the better they will be in terms of reaching true value pricing for assets faster and more accurately. The rapid availability of high quality information means efficient pricing and increased market stability.

Despite all this, the bubbles and crises in the markets have been coming more frequently. In some cases – such as the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) at the end of the 1990s, and more recently the subprime mortgage crisis, the smart guys have been directly implicated. After all, having Myron Scholes and Robert Merton – two Nobel Prize laureates for Economic Sciences – on the board of LTCM clearly didn’t prevent the company’s collapse.

So why are our supposedly sophisticated, agile and technologically advanced markets behaving in a way that is reminiscent of markets at the turn of the 19th century?

Momentum, competition and risk

In essence, there are three reasons why a large number of smart people makes markets more fragile. Firstly, more smart trend spotting means more momentum, both on the way up, and on the way down. Secondly and thirdly, the nature of competition on Wall Street, and the way practioners are compensated, both lead to riskier behaviour.

One of the things the smart guys have worked out is that following a trend – aka ‘momentum investing’ – is a profitable investment strategy. For example, if technology stocks are on an upward trend, it’s profitable to follow the trend and invest in technology stocks. The upward trend in prices will continue to a certain point. Of course, no one can accurately predict when this point is reached. There is likely to be eventual overshooting as the later trend chasers push the asset price beyond what the fundamentals would suggest its true value to be.

Nonetheless, trend chasing remains profitable on average, because even in smart markets, some people catch on quicker than others. Later investors – the ones that get the news last, or are slowest to act on it – stand to lose.

By identifying the profitability of trend chasing, the smart guys have popularised an investment strategy that, while largely profitable, creates price bubbles. Bubbles burst leading to market instability and, in the worst cases, market collapse.

Another way in which increased IQ on Wall Street contributes to instability is through competitive pressure, leading to risky behaviour. Job insecurity on Wall Street is higher than in other sectors, and it has increased in recent years due to the liquid labour market. This lack of security pushes ambitious traders towards strategies that yield profits with less regard for risk. And when employees are smarter than their managers, some of their actions or the nature of the risks they are taking may not be easily visible or readily understood.

What’s more, excessive compensation encourages risky behaviour, which throws wood on the fire; the amount of risk-taking that leverage enables, adds gasoline; and the conflicts of interest that emerge in some of the big finance institutions (for example, competing in two sides of a market trade such as buying and selling mortgages), further fan the flames.

So are smarter markets better markets?

Markets are as susceptible to bubbles and troughs as they were when they were much slower in their operation. But for very different reasons. Nonetheless, the genie won’t go back in the bottle. Governments cannot regulate IQ or employment patterns. But they can influence the rules of the game to decrease the attractiveness of risky behaviour and eliminate conflicts of interest.

Cafe21C: The inadequacy of economics

Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

In the first of our Cafe21C interview series, B21C editor Mike Hanley talks to Dr Paul Woolley, founder of the Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality at the London School of Economics, the University of Toulouse, and UTS; Ron Bird, Professor of Finance and Economics at UTS: Business, and Jack Gray, Adjunct Professor of Economics at UTS: Business.

The conversation ranged across the gamut of economics, from the inadequacy of the efficient markets hypothesis, through the impact of agents on the size of the financial markets and their efficiency, through to policy prescriptions to avoid another crisis.